We study how economic incentives affect labor force exit through different income security programs, old-age pensions as well as income taxes in Sweden. We use the option value for staying in the labor force as a measure of economic incentives and estimate an econometric model for the choice of leaving the labor market. Besides old-age pension, we focus on the Disability Insurance (DI), which is the most important exit path before age 65. By simulating the effect of different probabilities to be admitted DI we show how changes in the stringency of DI admittance affects labor supply among older workers through economic incentives.
Introduction
In absence of a state early retirement scheme, the Disability Insurance (DI) program in Sweden is by far the most common pathway for labor market exit for those who exit before age 65. In the early 1990s the share of the age group 60-64 receiving DI was around 35 percent for both men and women. Although this share has decreased considerably following a series of reforms of eligibility rules, still about 17 percent of men and 25 percent of women in this age group receive DI. This is a larger share than in most other comparable countries (see e.g. Wise, 2012).
In Jönsson et al. (2012) it was shown that historical changes in eligibility rules affected utilization of the DI program. However, an outstanding question is to what extent general changes in DI stringency will lead to increased labor force participation. This depends on the economic incentives induced by the old age pension scheme and the DI program as well as on how people react on economic incentives in their retirement decision. If the generosity in benefits is very similar in the old-age and DI programs or if people are not very sensitive to economic incentives in their retirement decisions, the effect of changes in the stringency of DI acceptance will lead to only very small changes in labor force participation rates. Conversely, if differences in economic incentives between the two schemes are very large and if people are very sensitive to these differences there will be comparatively large effects on labor force participation rates.
In this paper we use an option value model (see Stock and Wise, 1990) to estimate the effect of economic incentives on retirement behavior of older workers in Sweden. We consider two different pathways to retirement: the old-age pension path and the social insurance path. The latter includes the Unemployment Insurance (UI), the Sickness Insurance (SI) and DI, but we focus on the incentives provided by the DI program. We use data including the entire Swedish population aged between age 50 and 69 and estimate the model on the observed retirement behavior between 2001 and 2008. We use the estimated model to simulate the employment effect of different policy regimes for DI acceptance.
We find that there is a significant effect of economic incentives on DI utilization. Our results also suggest that there are important between group heterogeneity: the quintile group with the most inferior health status as well as low educated respond more strongly on economic incentives. The simulation exercises, however, show that the effects of economic incentives, through changes in the stringency of DI admittance, overall are quite small. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of Sweden's income security systems, describes recent developments in DI rates and employment among older workers and, finally, describes different pathways for exit from the Swedish labor market.
Section 3 presents our data and the empirical approach. Section 4 presents the estimation results from the econometric models. Section 5 discusses the outcomes from the policy simulations. Section 6 concludes.
Background

Sweden's social security and income security systems
In this section we describe the institutional details of Sweden's income security systems that we account for in this paper. We consider both the public system as well as the centrally bargained plans. We also describe the simplifications we made in the calculations of the incentive measure. The empirical analysis includes individuals aged between 50 and 69 during the period 2001 to 2008, i.e., born between 1932 and 1958 . We only describe the rules that applied to these cohorts.
The old-age pension system
Sweden recently went through a major reform of its public old-age pension system. The old system was a pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension system, whereas the new system is a mixture of a notional defined contribution pay-as-you-go pension system and a fully funded The pre-reform old-age pension system consists of two main parts: a basic pension and an income-related supplementary pension. All Swedish citizens permanently living in Sweden are entitled to a basic pension, which is 96 percent of one Basic Amount (BA) 1 for singles and 78.5 percent for married. The BA is an indexation unit that price adjusts the Swedish income security system. It is politically determined, but has followed the CPI very closely. There is also a supplementary pension (ATP), which is determined by the average of the 15 best years in the individual's income history up to 7.5 BA. 2, 3, 4 It is linearly reduced if the person contributed less than 30 years to the scheme. The normal retirement age for both the basic and the supplementary pension is 65, but both could be claimed in advance with a 0.5 percent actuarial reduction per month of early withdrawal from age 61 and delayed with an actuarial addition of 0.7 percent for each month of delay until age 70. Individuals with no, or low, ATP are entitled to a special supplement of 56.9 percent of a BA, reduced on a one-to-one basis against the supplementary pension.
In the new public pension system contributions amount to 18.5 percent of pensionable income, of which 16 percent is credited to a notional defined contribution scheme and 2.5 percent is credited to a financial defined contribution scheme. In the calculations, we disregard the financial defined contribution scheme and attribute the full 18.5 percent to the notional defined contribution scheme. Therefore, we also do not describe the financial scheme but refer to Hagen (2013) for a detailed description.
1 One BA was SEK 45,900/USD 6,600 in 2010. 2 From 1996 the ceiling was 7.5 increased price base amounts and from 2001 the ceiling is 7.5 income base amounts. The increased price base amount follows the prices in the economy, and the income base amount follows incomes. This means than the income price base amount is higher than the price base amount and accordingly the increased price base amount. 3 The pensionable income is the annual income from labor earnings and public transfer systems below the social security ceiling of 7.5 price base amounts. To simplify calculations, we only account for the pensionable income that comes from labor earnings and the collection of disability benefits, but no other public transfer systems. 4 The benefit level from the ATP is determined in several steps. First, the pension points for each year are calculated as the pensionable income above one price base amount divided by the current year price base amount. Since the social security ceiling is 7.5 price base amounts, the maximum number of pension points that can be collected each year is 6.5. Thereafter, the average pension points is calculated as the average of the individual's 15 best years in terms of pension points collected. Finally, the individual's ATP pension income is calculated by applying the formula ( ) where is the average pension points, is the price base amount, and is the number of years with pension-rights income greater than zero.
In the notional defined contribution scheme individuals collect notional pension rights based on their annual pensionable income and the annual contributions are used to finance current pension benefits in a pay-as-you-go system. The pensionable income is the total wage and public transfer income minus a 7 percent general pension contribution paid by all employees.
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The maximum pensionable income is 7.5 income base amounts. Annual pensionable income must exceed a threshold of 42.3 percent of the price base amount to yield pension rights. The new pension system is based on the life-income principle and pension rights are accumulated from age 16 or from year 1960. Accumulated pension rights are adjusted annually according to an income index reflecting the average wage growth. In this paper, we assume an average wage growth of 1.6 percent throughout the period.
There is no normal pension age in the new public pension system but the minimum age of withdrawal is 61. Pension benefits at the age of retirement are calculated as the accumulated pension rights divided by an annuity divisor that is determined by average life expectancy for the given cohort at the given retirement age and an imputed real return of 1.6 percent. If the current year contributions are too small to cover the pension payments an automatic balance mechanism is activated. In this paper, we assume that funds are enough to finance the pension payments and disregard the automatic balance mechanism but for further details, see Hagen (2013) .
For individuals with no or low earnings, the new pension system also contains a means-tested pension supplement that replaced the universal basic pension and the special supplement in the old pension system from 1 January 2003. For cohorts born from 1938 onwards, the so called guaranteed pension amounts to 2.13 income base amounts minus public pension benefits if public pension benefits are smaller than 1.26 income base amounts. If public pension benefits are larger than 1.26 income base amounts, the guaranteed pension is 0.87 income base amounts minus 48 percent of the public pension benefits that exceed 1.26 income base amounts. This implies that the guaranteed pension is phased out for individuals with public pension benefits above 3.07 income base amounts.
For those born before 1938, the rules for guaranteed pension are slightly different. For these cohorts, both public pension benefits and occupational pension benefits are taken into 5 The general pension contribution was introduced in 1999 and amounted to 6.95 percent in 1999 and 7 percent from 2000 onwards.
account. Given the sum of public and occupational pension (P), the formulas for the guaranteed pension benefits are:
The disability insurance system
Before 2003, the disability insurance was part of the old public pension system. Benefits were calculated in the same way as old-age pension, consisting of the basic pension and an incomerelated ATP supplement. As for old-age pension, the basic pension amounted to 96 percent of the basic amount for a single and 78.5 percent for a married disability pensioner. The special supplement for disability benefits was substantially larger than for old-age pension, however, at 112.9 percent of a basic amount, reduced on a one-to-one basis against the supplementary pension.
The supplementary pension in the old disability insurance system was based on an "assumed"
income. The assumed income was calculated as the most favorable outcome from two different calculations. The first one was the average income of the two best out of the last four years before retirement. The second was the average income of half of the years during which the individual had positive pension points. The assumed income was used in the same formula as for old-age pension, but was not subject to the actuarial reduction for withdrawal in advance. The number of contribution years was calculated as the sum of the actual number of contribution years and the number of years between retirement and age 64. If this sum was lower than 30, benefits were reduced in the same way as for the old-age pension.
Since 2003, the disability insurance system is part of the social insurance system. Benefits are based on the assumed income, which is calculated as the average of the three highest annual earnings up to 7.5 income base amounts during the frame time immediately preceding labor force exit. The frame time is 8 years for individuals below age 47, 7 years for individuals between age 47 and age 50, 6 years for individuals between age 50 and 53, and 5 years for individuals above age 53. Disability benefits amount to 64 percent of the assumed income.
Individuals with low assumed income receive a guaranteed level of disability benefits (amounting to 2.4 income BAs). Individuals collect pension points and pension rights also during periods with disability benefits. The collection is based on the total assumed income, not only on the benefit payments, during the years until age 65. At age 65, individuals are transferred from the disability insurance system to the public pension system, with no reduction in public pension benefits due to early withdrawal.
The eligibility rules for the DI have been changed on several occasions since the early 1970s.
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Since the early 1990s there have been a series of reforms leading to more stringent rules for DI admittance. In 1991 the right to receive DI for long-term unemployed workers older than age 60 was abolished and the right to DI for labor market reasons combined with health reasons was abolished in 1997. In 2003 the eligibility rules were further strengthened. The rules changed so that the ability to work should be tested against the entire labor market, not just the job that the insured worker was on when applying for DI. Finally, in 2008 a number of changes affecting eligibility were implemented. Most importantly, eligibility now required permanent disability.
Occupational pension plans, taxation and means-tested benefits
In addition to the public pension system, the most important pension schemes on the Swedish labor market are the occupational pension plans. Sweden has a highly unionized labor market.
More than 90 percent of the labor market is covered by central agreements. These agreements contain, among other things, pension benefits and supplementary disability insurance. There are four main programs: one for white collar workers in the private sector, one for blue collar workers in the private sector, one for central government employees and, finally, one for local government employees. A main motivation for all these programs is to insure earnings above the social security ceiling at 7.5 BA. Svensson (1999 and 2004) give a detailed description of these programs. We also provide a detailed description of the rules that applied during our period of study in the Appendix.
The option value of delaying retirement also depends on taxes. During the period under study there has been a tax bracket creep in the state income tax system, but also an introduction of an earned income tax credit in 2007. The details of the tax system during this period are described in the Appendix. We further account for means-tested benefits which are also described in the Appendix.
The development of disability rates and employment
The DI program is one of the most important programs in Sweden's income security system. Figure 1 shows the participation in the DI program since the early 1960s by different age groups for males and females, respectively. Figure 1 shows that there are huge variations in the participation rates, in particular for the age group 60-64. This partially reflects the fact that, as described in Section 2.1.2, the DI program has served somewhat different purposes over the period under study. In the 1970s and 1980s it was for example possible to get DI for labor market reasons. Older long-term unemployed workers were eligible for DI first for health reasons in combination with labor market reasons and then for labor market reasons alone. The decline in the DI participation rate reflects several changes in eligibility rules. The development for females is affected by a strong trend towards higher female labor force participation in all age groups during the period under study. For males in all age groups, however, it is apparent that there is a relationship between employment and DI participation:
when the DI participation rate increased from the early 1960s until the mid 1990s there is a trend towards a lower employment rate in this group. Likewise, when DI participation declined in the 1990s there is an increase in the employment rate in this age group. Figure 7 shows that the pattern from Figure 6 on the probability of retiring through the social insurance pathway is repeated for labor force participation rates by health quintile in the age group 50-69 for both men and women. The figure also shows that the increased labor force participation rate is primarily attributed to the groups with a good health status both among men and women.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the share of individuals who retired through the social insurance pathway in the age group 50-64 by health quintile and education group, combined over the entire period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The figure shows that that the pattern across health quintiles seen in Figure 6 is stable within education groups. It also shows that the pattern across education groups is stable within health quintiles, i.e., the fact that low educated are more likely to retire through the social insurance pathway is not only attributed to inferior health. We use information on income from labor to define the year of labor force exit. In each year, a worker is defined as employed if labor earnings from employment or self-employment exceed one basic amount (BA), which corresponds to SEK 45,900 or USD 6,600 in 2010. A worker is defined as retired if not being employed for two consecutive years. If such periods occur several times, the last occurrence is used to define retirement. For a worker who is not observed in the data during the second year after the last year with income from labor or selfemployment, which may occur due to death or the individual moving abroad, we use the last year with sufficient labor income as year of retirement. The retirement age is the age in the last year of employment before retirement. An individual who is employed in the last year of observation has retirement age. We have data of the Swedish population until 2010. Because of the way we define retirement, we are able to study retirement behavior until year 2008.
About 11.5 million person-year observations are included in the empirical analysis.
Pathways to retirement
We consider two main pathways to retirement: the social insurance pathway and the old-age pension pathway. The pathway to retirement is defined on the basis of main income source during the years after the exit from the labor force and before age 64. For each of these years we define the pathway from the largest income source. We then assign the pathway with most years to the individual. The social insurance pathway includes the total income from the sickness, disability and unemployment insurances. The pension pathway includes the total income from occupational pension and public pension. A worker that retires at age 65 or later is assigned to the pension pathway, since eligibility for most social insurance benefits ceases at age 65. The figure shows that the importance of the pension pathway has steadily increased for both men and women over the studied period. Although the pension pathway was less common among women than men in the beginning of the period, the importance of the pension pathway has increased more rapidly among women. By 2008, the pension pathway accounts for about 80 percent of all labor force exits in the age group 50-69 among both men and women. In a second step, we use these four variables to construct a health index for all individuals included in our sample. For each year, we create a health index based on the first principal 9 The coverage of the outpatient care register is not complete during the first years of the period and increases for each year. However, since we construct a health index for each year separately this is not a concern. The information contained in the register helps dividing individuals into health quintiles, and the increased coverage of the register over time may lead to better measures of health during the later years. 
Option value calculations
We use the option value measure (see Stock and Wise, 1990) for the economic incentive to remain in the labor force. The option value uses the value function measuring the utility for a particular individual at a particular age t for retiring at a particular age r as:
where ( ) is income from labor at age s, ( ) is income from the income security system at age s if retiring at age r, β is the subjective discount rate , k reflects the marginal utility of leisure and γ measures the marginal utility of consumption; ( ) gives the probability of being alive at age s given survival until age t. The option value is then defined as the difference between the utility of retiring at age t+1 compared to the utility of retiring at the optimal age r * , the age yielding the highest utility value, i.e.,
We do not estimate the parameters δ, k and γ, but assign values similar to those that have been obtained in previous studies (see primarily Gruber and Wise, 2004) . We have chosen to set the subjective discount rate (δ) to 3 percent, k to 1.5 and γ to 0.75.
The income from the income security system depends, in addition to the retirement age, on how the individual leaves the labor force. As mentioned above, we consider two pathways to retirement: the social insurance pathway and the pension pathway. There is a possible endogeneity problem related to assigning possible pathway to retirement for each individual in our sample. If we assign the more generous DI pathway to all, although we know that this is not an available option for a large share of the sample, it will appear as the individuals in the sample do not react on the more generous incentives to retire than they actually face and we will consequently underestimate the effect of economic incentives on retirement. If we instead assign the DI pathway when we observe that he or she has access to it, we will of course overestimate the effect of economic incentives.
To handle this endogeneity problem we use a probabilistic approach. This means that we calculate a weighted sum of the option value measure for the two pathways that we consider,
where the OVDI is the option value measure for the DI pathway and OVSS is the option value for the old-age pension pathway. DIweight captures the likelihood that the DI path is available to the individual. These are determined based on the "stock estimator". The weight for the DI pathway is determined by the share of individuals between age 50 and 64 who have exited through the social insurance pathway in each year, gender and education group. The pathway probabilities were thus shown in Figure 4 .
In the data, the social insurance pathway includes income from the disability, sickness and unemployment insurances. The major source, however, is the disability insurance with about 75 percent of the person*year observations including only disability benefits. Those who exit from the labor market through the unemployment or the sickness insurances switches in most cases to the disability insurance after some time (see Palme and Svensson, 2004 , for a detailed analysis of different pathways). To simplify, we will only consider the economic incentives in the disability insurance for the social insurance pathway.
The pension pathway consists of occupational pensions and the public old-age pension system. In the option value calculations, we consider, in addition to benefits from these two pension systems, also take housing supplements as well as the special housing allowance for old-age pensioners, the so called old-age support into account (see the Appendix Section A3).
For both pathways, we calculate the option value net of income taxes.
To make earnings back-casts and forecasts, we use earnings data for the entire population of That is, we assume that a worker starts working and collecting pension rights at age 23. The option value is expressed in EUR 10,000 (2011).
We do not account for spouse or survivor benefits, but treat all individuals as if they were singles. Most of the financial incentives in the Swedish systems apply to the individual and not the household and the differences that do exist between married and singles are relatively minor. Figure 11 shows the averages of the three different option value measures by age for men and women, respectively. The figure reveals some interesting features. First, it can be seen that the option value for the old-age pension pathway has a much steeper negative slope than the option value for the DI pathway and the weighted average reflected in the inclusive option value. This reflects the fact that the economic loss of retiring early is much larger for those who only have access to the old-age pathway. Second, it can be seen that the inclusive option value is as expected between the option value measures for the two main pathways, but much closer to the graph for the old-age pathway. This is because the weights, as reported in Figures 4a and 4b , are larger for the old-age pension pathway. It should be noted, however, that these figures are based on a cross-section and thus affected by sample attrition by age. As a background to the option value figures, Figure 12 shows the average social security wealth by age and pathway to retirement for men and women, respectively. It can be seen that the social security wealth for the DI pathway declines with retirement age, since the value of the DI payments that one gives up by delaying retirement exceeds the expected value of increases in the size of the benefits from longer work history. However, for the old-age pension pathway it increases up to age 60, the minimum age for early withdrawal, and then reaches a horizontal phase. This suggests that, on average, the present value of the benefit payment one has to give up by remaining in the labor force is equal to the increase in the size of the future benefits from delaying retirement. 
Results
Main estimates
This section presents the results from the reduced form retirement choice models. The estimates are obtained using probit models and are presented in three main sets. Table 1 shows the overall results for the entire sample. Table 2 describes sample heterogeneity in response to economic incentives with respect to health status and, finally, Table 3 shows heterogeneity of the result with respect to differences in educational attainments.
The results for the coefficient of the option value variable should be interpreted as the effect of a 10,000 euro (measured in 2012 prices) change in the utility difference between retiring at a given age compared to retiring at the optimal age on the probability of retiring. The effect of a one standard deviation change in the option value measure is given in square brackets below the coefficients. In addition, all results are presented in a second version of the tables (1b, 2b
and 3b), where the coefficients are presented as the estimated response to a one percent change in the utility value of delaying retirement by one year. Table 1a shows the results from eight different specifications. The first column shows the results when we alongside the option value measure for retirement incentives and a linear age variable have included dummy variables for each health quintile, with the first quintile, those with worse health status, being the excluded category. As expected, there is a negative sign on the coefficient estimate for the option value measure. Thanks to an exceptionally large sample size the precision of the estimate is impressively high and the estimate is highly significant.
The magnitude of the estimate suggests that a 10,000 euro increase in the inclusive option value measure would lead to a 0.12 percentage point reduction in the retirement rate. The estimates also shows that those in the highest health quintile are on average about 1.6
percentage points less likely to exit the labor force compared to the quintile group with worse health status.
The second column in Table 1a reports results from a specification where the linear age variable has been replaced by a more flexible specification with age dummies for each oneyear age group. The results seem to be quite robust to this change. The coefficient estimate changes from -0.0012 to -0.0020, a change on the fourth decimal. The specification shown in columns three and four corresponds to those in the first and second columns, but we now also include controls for a number of demographic characteristics. The result for the inclusive option value measure in the specification in the fourth column does not change much compared to the one in column two. However, the estimate in the third column is substantially smaller in absolute value compared to the corresponding one in column one. The estimates for the demographic variables show for example that women on average retire earlier, since they have an about 0.5 percentage point higher retirement rate than men. The estimates of the dummy variables for the different education levels indicate large differences in the timing of the exit from the labor market between different educational groups: the group with college or university education has on average an about 1.1 percentage point lower retirement rate compared to those with compulsory education only.
The models shown in the fifth through the eighth columns of Table 1a correspond to the ones shown in the first four columns with the difference that the dummy variables for the five health quintiles are replaced by a linear variable in the health indexed used for constructing the quintile groups. The estimates of the inclusive option value measure for these alternative specifications are very similar to the corresponding original ones.
To sum up, the results from the eight specifications shown in Table 1a all give negative and significant estimates of the inclusive option value measure, i.e., estimates show that economic incentives matter for the timing of the exit from the labor market. The preferred specification, which includes the most flexible specification in age and health differences together with controls for demographic variables shown in the fourth column, suggests that a 10,000 euro change in the inclusive option value would lead to a 0.15 percent change in the retirement rate. Since the average retirement rate is 5.19 percent in the age group under study, this implies that retirement would change by 2.9 percent. Table 1a also shows that a one standard deviation change in the option value would translate into a 1.34 percent lower retirement rate.
The result in Table 1b for this specification shows that a one percent increase in the option value would lead to a 3.15 percentage point reduction in the retirement rate. Table 2a and 2b show the same results as in Table 1a and 1b, but the sample is now divided by health quintile. For obvious reasons, we now only include the health index linearly as a control variable. The results reveal that the group with worse health status, the first quintile, reacts strongest on economic incentives. The coefficient estimates decrease monotonically across the five groups. However, if one relates the estimates to the average retirement rates in the groups, it can be seen that the percentage change is very similar in all groups. This is true also for the results of the response to the percentage change in the option value presented in Table 2b . Table 3a and 3b show the results when the sample is divided in four groups by educational attainment. The first group includes individuals that have not obtained any education beyond the compulsory level; the second group consists of those with vocational education in addition to compulsory schooling; the third group those who graduated from an academic track in their secondary education; and, finally, the fourth group are those with college or university education. The specifications corresponds to the first four ones in Table 1a , i.e., all specifications includes dummy variable for health quintiles; the specifications in the first and third columns includes linear controls for age, while those in the second and fourth columns uses age dummies; the specifications in the third and fourth columns include controls for the demographic characteristics shown in Table 1b .
Although the estimates vary somewhat between the four different specifications it seems that the low education groups reacts more strongly on economic incentives in their retirement behavior. This result emerges more clearly if one compares the lowest and the highest education groups. The coefficient estimates for the inclusive option value measure is significantly larger in all specifications for the low education group. 
The model fit
To evaluate the model we use the preferred specification, shown in the fourth columns in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Figure 13 shows the results when this model is used to predict the retirement rates by age and compare it with the actual retirement pattern. Figure 13a and 13b compare the hazard rates by age for males and females, respectively, and Figures 13c and 13d show the corresponding results for the cumulative distribution function.
From these figures it can be seen that the model underestimates retirement in relatively early ages and overestimates it in later ages for men. The opposite is true for women. Overall, however, it is apparent that the model gives a very good prediction of the actual outcome. Figure 14 shows the results of Tables 2 and 3 graphically. Figures 14a and 14b show the predicted retirement hazards by age for the five health quintiles, for males and females, respectively. It can be seen that the largest difference in retirement behavior is between the first quintile, those with worse health status, compared to the other four groups. This is true for both males and females. 
Descriptive key results in graphical form
Implications of changes in DI eligibility stringency
A key motivation for the study of how economic incentives affect retirement behavior is that it has implications for how screening stringency in the disability insurance program affects labor force participation rates among older workers. If an older worker is denied DI, an alternative is to claim old-age pension, which is a less generous exit path given actuarial reductions for early withdrawal. We use our estimated preferred model (Table 1a Column 4) to simulate the difference in retirement behavior in our sample under the hypothetical policy regime that all workers were eligible for the DI pathway -regardless of health statuscompared to the regime where no one was eligible, i.e., if only the old-age pension path is available. The driving force behind the observed differences is purely that the insured individuals are affected by economic incentives in their decision on when to leave the labor force. Figure 15 shows the cumulative retirement hazards for these two policy simulations for males and females, respectively. As a summary of the effects of the policy simulations, Figure 16 shows the expected remaining number years of work between age 50 and 69 of the two hypothetical policy regimes compared to the actual state. As expected, the cumulative hazard function for the policy regime where all workers are eligible to DI are everywhere below the corresponding regime with no DI. As can be seen in the summary measure in Figure 16 , the simulated difference between the expected lengths of the work life is 0.82 years, or a 5.9 percent prolonging of the work life after age 50, for men and 0.75 years, or 5.6 percent for women. The Disability Insurance is not a relevant exit path from the labor force for a quite large share of the population. This implies that the simulations shown above overestimate the effect though economic incentives of every relevant policy reform altering the DI screening stringency and should therefore be interpreted as an "upper bound" for possible effects of such reforms. However, the problem is that we do not know the size of the group for which DI is a relevant exit path depending on screening stringency. In addition, the group for whom it is a relevant exit path differs from those for which it is not on several observable as well as unobservable characteristics.
The most restrictive definition of the group for which the Disability Insurance is a relevant exit path is to include only those who we observe use the DI pathway for exit from the labor force. As an alternative simulation strategy, we therefore repeat the simulations reported above on the sub-sample of individuals that we observe retiring through the Disability Insurance path separately. The economic incentives for retirement facing these individuals may differ from what we observe in the entire sample. These differences may generate differences in the result of the simulation. However, since we use the same estimated models as in the simulations reported above, possible heterogeneity parameters reflecting sensitivity to economic incentives in retirement behavior between the two samples is not taken into account. Figure 17 shows the cumulative distribution functions for the subsample of DI recipients under different regimes of DI acceptance probabilities. The graphs stop at age 63, i.e., at the age when the individuals consider retiring at age 64, which is the oldest age for DI eligibility.
In addition to the simulation where we shut down the DI option -i.e., zero probability of DI acceptance -and the simulation where everybody is eligible for DI, we also consider the cases where one third (1/3) and two thirds (2/3) of the group is eligible for DI. As expected, the differences between the simulations with zero probability versus 100 percent probabilities, shown in the two upper panels of Figure 17 are much larger than the simulation of two thirds versus on third DI probabilities, shown in the two lower panels of Figure 17 .
As a summary measure for the simulations, Figure 18 shows the simulated expected remaining time in the labor force at age 50 under the different policy regimes described above. Comparing the results shown in Figure 18 with the corresponding ones for the entire sample shown in Figure 16 , it can be seen that the simulated expected duration of the remaining work life is considerably shorter for those retiring through the DI program. This reflects the fact that these individuals on average have an inferior health status and lower educational attainments than the rest of the sample. However, comparing the simulated differences between the policy regimes in Figure 18 with those in Figure 16 suggest that the policy response is quite similar in the two samples. This suggests that differences in economic incentives in retiring through the DI path do not drive the observed differences in retirement ages. 
Conclusions
In this paper we first estimate an econometric model for the choice between staying in the labor market and leaving it for older workers in Sweden. We consider the economic incentives of two different exit paths from the labor force: the old-age pension path and a composite path consisting of other income security programs, where the DI program is the most important. We then simulate the effect if the probability of being admitted DI is changed from zero to 100 percent. The behavioral response to these changes comes through how the individuals in the sample respond to economic incentives in their retirement decision.
We find that the option value of retirement has a statistically significant impact on retirement behavior, i.e., economic incentives generated by income taxes and the income security system significantly affects the timing of the exit from the labor market. We also find that there are statistically significant differences between different population groups. The quintile group with the most inferior health status reacts stronger on economic incentives and the strength of the reaction seems to decrease monotonically with health. The difference is even larger between groups with different educational attainments. People with lower education are more sensitive to economic incentives in their retirement behavior.
The simulation exercises, however, show that the effects of economic incentives, through changes in the stringency of DI admittance, overall are quite small. Going from 0 to 100 percent DI admittance probability in the male population would increase the expected number of years in the labor force at age 50 from 13.17 to 13.93 years.
In Jönsson, Palme and Svensson (2012) it was shown that changes in the rules for DI eligibility in the long run gave very sizeable effects on labor force participation. Also, Figure   2 in Section 2.2 of this paper shows that employment in the age group 60-64 increased from Individuals on disability benefits are also granted supplementary benefits from the state occupational pension plan from the retirement age up to age 65. The supplementary disability benefits amount to 15 percent on income up to 7.5 increased price base amounts, 65 percent on income between 7.5 and 20 increased price base amounts and 32.5 percent on income between 20 and 30 increased price base amounts.
A1.3. The municipality sector
Cohorts in the municipality sector born before 1938 are covered by the PA-KL agreement.
The pension points (P) for the defined benefit pension in PA-KL are the average earnings proportionally if the number of contribution years from age 28 is less than 30.
A1.4. Blue-collar workers in the private sector
Since 1996, blue-collar workers in the private sector are covered by the SAF-LO agreement, which is a defined contribution scheme. Before then, workers were covered by the STP plan, which is a defined benefits scheme. Cohorts born after 1968 are fully covered by the SAF-LO agreement, whereas cohorts born between 1932 and 1968 are subject to special transitional rules between the two schemes. The premium under the SAF-LO agreement was 2 percent of annual earnings before year 2000 and is 3.5 percent on annual earnings from 2000 onwards.
Pension rights are collected between age 21 and 65. Pension can be collected from age 55.
The transitional rules for cohorts born between 1932 and 1968 are somewhat complicated and we have not been able to find any documents explaining these rules. We only had these rules explained to us by an employee at AMF Pension, administering the pension payments. For these cohorts, the pension wealth in 1996 was determined by the defined benefit pension under the STP plan based on the average income from all years from age 28 until 1995. This pension wealth was brought along to the defined contribution STP plan. From 1996, individuals collected new pension points according to the STP rules. Since the transitional rules are rather unclear, we simplify our calculations by assuming that pension rights for the defined contribution plan SAF-LO was collected between ages 21 and 65 with a premium of 2 percent before year 2000 and 3.5 percent from year 2000 onwards.
A2. The income tax system
Individuals pay income taxes on earnings, public pension, sickness-, unemployment-and disability benefits and occupational pension. This is accounted for in the option value calculations. Individuals pay municipal income tax on the income, net of a basic deduction. If income exceeds a certain break point, individuals also pay a state income tax. In 2007, an earned income tax credit was introduced, which is also accounted for in the calculations.
The basic deduction is based on the total income (I) and is calculated according to the following formula, expressed in price base amounts: The municipality income tax varies across municipalities and may change over time. In this paper, we do not take the municipality of residence into account but apply the average municipality income tax rate in each year for all individuals. The state income tax has two thresholds. Above the first threshold, the state income tax is 20 percent and above the second threshold, the state income tax is 25 percent. These brackets have changed over time. Table   A1 presents the average municipality income tax and the two thresholds in the state income tax during the period 2001-2008, which is the period under study. The earned income tax credit applied to earnings but not to income from public pension or public transfers such as disability benefits. The tax credit was a function of earned income (E), the basic deduction (BD) and the municipality income tax rate (T). 
A3.2. Special housing supplement and old-age support
Individuals with very low income can also be granted special housing supplement or old-age support. The rules are very similar. The calculation is based on the total net income, including housing supplement. The special housing supplement or old-age support equals 1.3546 price base amounts plus the housing cost of maximum 6,200 SEK per month minus net income.
